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ARTICLES 
 
Successor Liability for Defective 
Products: A Redesign Ongoing 
Richard L. Cupp, Jr.† 
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As noted by Plutarch, “[T]ime [is] the wisest counselor of 
all.”1  It teaches lessons.  It also proves predictions—including 
predictions about evolution of the law—to be on the mark or 
errant.  The American Law Institute’s treatment of successor 
corporate liability in the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products 
Liability,2 completed in 1997, relied heavily on predictions in 
setting its proposed standard.  The Restatement (Third) sought, 
among other things, to address the circumstances under which 
a successor corporation should be liable for defective products 
sold by a predecessor corporation.  It made the controversial 
prediction that the “continuity of enterprise” and “product line” 
approaches (hereafter sometimes referred to as “the less 
restrictive approaches”) to determining the liability of 
successor corporations for products liability claims are dead to 
growth, and it asserted that these approaches have been 
rejected by “a substantial majority of courts.”3   
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 1 1 PLUTARCH, PLUTARCH’S LIVES 218 (Arthur Hugh Clough ed., John 
Dryden trans., Random House 2001). 
 2 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  PRODS. LIAB. (1997). 
 3 Id. § 12 cmt. b, Reporters’ Notes (“[A]fter an early spurt of cases in the late 
1970s and early 1980s arguing for more expansive liability, courts have refused to 
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The nine years that have followed the Restatement 
(Third)’s predictions about successor products liability have not 
been kind to them.  Rather than a substantial majority 
rejecting the less restrictive approaches, courts that have 
firmly taken a position are in reality quite divided regarding an 
appropriate approach.4  The judicial landscape on this issue 
remains varied, with some courts recently adopting one or both 
of the less restrictive approaches, some courts recently 
adopting the more restrictive “traditional approach,” and some 
courts remaining undecided regarding an appropriate 
approach. 
The Restatement (Third) supports the traditional 
approach to corporate successor liability for products liability 
claims.  The traditional approach provides that an injured 
consumer cannot sue the successor unless one of the following 
exceptions applies: 
(1) The successor’s acquisition of the predecessor was accompanied 
by an agreement for the successor to assume such liability; 
(2) the acquisition resulted from a fraudulent conveyance to escape 
liability for the debts or liabilities of the predecessor; 
(3) the acquisition constituted a continuation or merger with the 
predecessor; or  
(4) the acquisition resulted in the successor becoming a mere 
continuation of the predecessor.5 
Critics assert that the traditional approach’s 
restrictiveness inappropriately shifts risk from the corporation 
to the consumer, who is much less able to bear that risk.6  
Numerous courts have adopted the less restrictive continuity of 
enterprise approach and/or the product line approach in 
response to that concern.   
  
impose liability unless the plaintiff is able to come within the four traditional 
exceptions.”). 
 4 See infra notes 35-125. 
 5 See 15 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER  CYCLOPEDIA OF THE 
LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 7122 (perm. ed., rev. vol. 1999). 
 6 See, e.g., Cyr v. B. Offen & Co., 501 F.2d 1145, 1154 (1st Cir. 1974) (finding 
the policy reasons underlying strict liability of a manufacturer applicable to cases 
involving successor corporations); Ramirez v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 431 A.2d 811, 825 
(N.J. 1981) (holding that the social policy of products liability warrants expansion of 
the traditional corporate rule); Ray v. Alad Corp., 560 P.2d 3, 8-9 (Cal. 1977) (justifying 
expansion of successor liability on the basis of strict liability principles); Turner v. 
Bituminous Cas. Co., 244 N.W.2d 873, 880 (Mich. 1976) (stating that strict liability 
principles should govern over those of corporate law). 
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The continuity of enterprise approach imposes liability 
on a successor corporation if the court concludes that the 
successor is sufficiently similar to the predecessor that it is in 
essence continuing the predecessor’s enterprise.  In making 
this determination, courts look to a broad range of factors, 
including whether there is continuity of management, 
personnel, assets, facilities, and operations;7 whether the 
predecessor dissolves as soon as practicable after the sale;8 
whether the business enterprise continues uninterrupted by 
the transfer;9 and whether the successor holds itself out to the 
consuming public as a continuing enterprise.10  Continuity of 
shareholders is an important factor under the continuity of 
enterprise approach, but courts may find a continuing 
enterprise even when the predecessor’s assets were sold to new 
shareholders,11 and even when the assets were sold for cash 
rather than for stock in the successor corporation.12  The 
continuity of enterprise approach does not require that the 
  
 7 See Turner, 244 N.W.2d at 883-84. 
 8 See id. at 884. 
 9 See id. 
 10 See id. 
 11 See Phillip I. Blumberg, The Continuity of Enterprise Doctrine: Corporate 
Successorship in United States Law, 10 FLA. J. INT’L L. 365, 375 (1996) (stating that 
while the mere continuation exception requires a continuity of shareholders, ‘continuity 
of enterprise’ focuses on a basic continuity of the business); Michael D. Green, 
Successor Liability: The Superiority of Statutory Reform to Protect Products Liability 
Claimants, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 17, 25 (1986) (stating that courts using the expanded 
continuation approach can find liability although there was a change in ownership); 
Howard L. Shecter, Selected Risk Issues in Merger and Acquisition Transactions, 51 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 719, 725 (1997) (explaining that ‘continuity of enterprise’ has its roots in 
the mere continuation exception); Timothy J. Murphy, Comment, A Policy Analysis of a 
Successor Corporation’s Liability for its Predecessor’s Defective Products when the 
Successor has Acquired the Predecessor’s Assets for Cash, 71 MARQ. L. REV. 815, 824-27 
(1988) (discussing the expansion of the mere continuation and de facto merger 
exceptions through case law). 
 12 A sale of assets for cash will not transfer liability under the traditional 
approach absent an agreement to assume such liability or a fraudulent conveyance.  
See Murphy, supra note 11, at 817-18. For a successor corporation to be held liable 
under either the de facto merger or mere continuation exceptions to the traditional 
rule, the shareholders of both entities must be the same.  See id. at 819-21.  In the case 
of a de facto merger, the successor corporation must acquire its predecessor’s assets 
with shares of its own stock.  See id. at 819; see also Pancrantz v. Monsanto Co., 547 
N.W.2d 198, 202 (Iowa 1996) (holding successor corporation not liable as mere 
continuation where there was no evidence of continuity of shareholders); Harris v. T.I., 
Inc., 413 S.E.2d 605, 609 (Va. 1992) (same); Green, supra note 11, at 23 (noting that 
courts that have expanded successor liability have eliminated the stock for 
consideration requirement of de facto merger and mere continuation exceptions); 
Michael D. Kristofco, Comment, Successor Liability:  The Debate over the Continuity of 
Enterprise Exception in Ohio is Really No Debate at All, 21 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 297, 301 
(1994) (listing continuity of shareholders as one of four factors necessary for a de facto 
merger). 
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successor continue selling the same product line as the 
predecessor, although selling the same product line is a factor 
that supports finding a continuing enterprise.13  
The product line approach imposes liability when the 
successor continues to market a product line previously sold by 
the predecessor.14  It differs from the continuity of enterprise 
approach by not requiring that the successor purchase the 
predecessor business as a going concern for liability to attach.  
Instead, it requires that the successor continue selling a 
product line sold by the predecessor.15 
It is these two approaches that the Restatement (Third) 
in 1997 labeled “unfair and socially wasteful,” and dismissed as 
a “small minority” that is the subject of “overwhelming judicial 
rejection.” 16   
  
 13 See Polius v. Clark Equip. Co., 802 F.2d 75, 81-82 (3d Cir. 1986) (noting 
that a successor corporation may still be liable under a ‘continuity of enterprise’ 
exception if it continues some, but not all, of the manufacturing activities of its 
predecessor); George L. Lenard, Note, Products Liability of Successor Corporations: A 
Policy Analysis, 58 IND. L.J. 677, 704 (1983) (distinguishing the continuity of enterprise 
approach from product line rule on the basis that under the former, a successor may be 
held liable where it did not continue the product line, but merely “uses the 
predecessor’s name or trademark”). 
 14 See Dick Hoffman, Note, Products Liability for Successor Corporations: A 
Break from Tradition, 49 U. COLO. L. REV. 357, 357 (1978) (tracing notable cases from 
the 1970s leading to the expansion of corporate successor liability); Roberta L. 
Schuhalter, Note, Successor Liability for Defective Products: A Tort Exception to a 
Corporate Rule, 10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 831, 846-47 & nn.130-46 (1982) (same); see also 
Carol A. Rogala, Comment, Nontraditional Successor Product Liability:  Should Society 
Be Forced to Pay the Cost?, 68 U. DET. L. REV. 37, 49-50 (1990) (“‘[A] party which 
acquires a manufacturing business and continues the output of its line of 
products . . . assumes strict tort liability for defects in units of the same product line 
previously manufactured and distributed by the entity from which the business was 
acquired.’” (quoting Ray v. Alad Corp., 560 P.2d 3, 11 (Cal. 1977))); Shecter, supra note 
11, at 726 (same). 
 15 See, e.g., Dorit F. Kressel, Successor Liability in Products Liability 
Litigation: Modern Judicial Response to Traditional Corporate Rules, 4 PROD. LIAB. 
L.J. 211, 221 (1993) (explaining that the method of the corporate acquisition is not 
relevant under the product line exception); Murphy, supra note 11, at 844 (stating that 
the product line exception disregards the business aspects of an acquisition, instead 
focusing on whether the successor continues output of the same product line); Mike 
Steenson, A Comparative Analysis of Minnesota Products Liability Law and the 
Restatement (Third) of Torts:  Products Liability, 24 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1, 78 (1998) 
(explaining that under the product line exception, liability will attach regardless of how 
the predecessor was acquired).  But see, e.g., Rawlings v. D.M. Oliver, Inc., 159 Cal. 
Rptr. 119, 124-25 (Ct. App. 1979) (imposing liability under the product line exception 
although the successor did not continue identical product line); Pacius v. Thermtroll 
Corp., 611 A.2d 15, 158 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1992) (holding the successor 
corporation liable under the product line exception where it did not continue to 
manufacture the product line). 
 16 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  PRODS. LIAB. § 12 & cmt. b, Reporters’ 
Notes (1997). 
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In 1999, one of this article’s authors tested the 
Restatement (Third)’s pronouncements in a law review article 
entitled Redesigning Successor Liability.17  The article 
examined the frequency of, and purpose behind, courts’ 
application of the traditional versus less restrictive approaches 
to corporate successor liability in products liability cases.  
Redesigning Successor Liability revealed that the less 
restrictive approaches are not subject to “overwhelming judicial 
rejection,” nor are they even a “small minority.”  To the 
contrary, as of 1999, eighteen states had adopted the 
traditional approach,18 and thirteen had adopted the continuity 
of enterprise approach19 or the product line approach.20  
  
 17 Richard L. Cupp, Jr., Redesigning Successor Liability, 1999 U. ILL. L. Rev. 
845 (1999). 
 18 See id. at 853 & n.41.  The count included states that adopted the 
traditional approach through either state supreme court decisions, lower court 
decisions, or federal court decisions attempting to apply state law.  The eighteen states 
applying the traditional approach at that time include Arkansas (Swayze v. A.O. Smith 
Corp., 694 F. Supp. 619, 622-24 (E.D. Ark. 1988) (applying Arkansas law)); Colorado 
(Johnston v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 830 P.2d 1141, 1142 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992)); Florida 
(Bernard v. Kee Mfg. Co., 409 So. 2d 1047, 1048 (Fla. 1982)); Illinois (Nilsson v. Cont’l 
Mach. Mfg. Co., 621 N.E.2d 1032, 1034-35 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993)); Iowa (Pancratz v. 
Monsanto Co., 547 N.W.2d 198, 201 (Iowa 1996)); Kentucky (Conn v. Fales Div. of 
Mathewson Corp., 835 F.2d 145, 148 (6th Cir. 1987) (applying Kentucky law)); 
Maryland (Nissen Corp. v. Miller, 594 A.2d 564, 573 (Md. 1991)); Minnesota (Niccum v. 
Hydra Tool Corp., 438 N.W.2d 96, 97 (Minn. 1989)); Missouri (Chem. Design, Inc. v. 
Am. Standard, Inc., 847 S.W.2d 488, 493 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993)); Nebraska (Jones v. 
Johnson Mach. & Press Co., 320 N.W.2d 481, 484 (Neb. 1982)); North Carolina (Budd 
Tire Corp. v. Pierce Tire Co., 370 S.E.2d 267, 269 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988)); North Dakota 
(Downtowner v. Acrometal Prods., 347 N.W.2d 118, 124-25 (N.D. 1984)); Oklahoma 
(Pulis v. U.S. Elec. Tool Co., 561 P.2d 68, 69 (Okla. 1977)); Texas (Mudgett v. Paxson 
Mach. Co., 709 S.W.2d 755, 758-59 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986)); Vermont (Ostrowski v. Hydra-
Tool Corp., 479 A.2d 126, 127 (Vt. 1984)); Virginia (Harris v. T.I., Inc., 413 S.E.2d 605, 
609-10 (Va. 1992)); West Virginia (Davis v. Celotex Corp., 420 S.E.2d 557, 563 (W. Va. 
1992)); and Wisconsin (Fish v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 376 N.W.2d 820, 821, 829 (Wis. 
1985)). 
 19 States following the continuity of enterprise approach at that time 
included Alabama (Asher v. KCS Int’l, Inc., 659 So. 2d 598, 599-600 (Ala. 1995)); 
Michigan (Turner v. Bituminous Cas. Co., 244 N.W.2d 873, 881-82 (Mich. 1976)); 
Mississippi (Mozingo v. Correct Mfg. Corp., 752 F.2d 168, 174-76 (5th Cir. 1985) 
(applying Mississippi law)); New Hampshire (Cyr v. B. Offen & Co., 501 F.2d 1145, 
1152-54 (1st Cir. 1974) (applying New Hampshire law)); Ohio (Flaugher v. Cone 
Automatic Mach. Co., 507 N.E.2d 331, 334 (Ohio 1987)); and South Carolina (Holloway 
v. John E. Smith’s  Sons Co., 432 F. Supp. 454, 455 (D.S.C. 1977) (applying South 
Carolina law)). 
 20 States following the product line approach at that time included California 
(Ray v. Alad Corp., 560 P.2d 3, 10 (Cal. 1977)); Connecticut (Sullivan v. A.W. Flint Co., 
No. CV 920339263, 1996 WL 469716, at *7, *8 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 5, 1996); 
Kennedy v. Oshkosh Truck Corp., No. CV92 0510394S, 1995 WL 27400, at *2, *4 
(Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 18, 1995); Copperthite v. Pytlik, No. 59053, 1992 WL 209660, at 
*4 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 25, 1992)); New Jersey (Ramirez v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 431 
A.2d 811, 817 (N.J. 1981)); New Mexico (Garcia v. Coe Mfg. Co., 933 P.2d 243, 248-50 
(N.M. 1997)); Pennsylvania (Dawejko v. Jorgensen Steel Co., 434 A.2d 106, 110 (Pa. 
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Demographically, the eighteen states that had adopted the 
traditional approach represented only thirty-eight percent of 
the United States population,21 while forty-three percent of the 
population resided in the thirteen states that had adopted one 
of the less restrictive approaches.22  Despite the Restatement 
(Third)’s death pronouncement, the less restrictive approaches 
were likely being applied in more lawsuits than was the 
traditional approach.23 
Redesigning Successor Liability also rejected the 
Restatement (Third)’s assertion that the less restrictive 
approaches are socially wasteful and unfair.  Redesigning 
Successor Liability argued, to the contrary, that the continuity 
of enterprise and product line approaches more effectively 
channel responsibility for products liability back to the 
predecessor corporation than does the traditional approach 
because they force successor corporations to consider the 
projected cost of the predecessor’s products liability at the time 
the successor purchases the predecessor.24  The article 
suggested that successor corporations often could minimize 
their risks by purchasing relatively inexpensive insurance.25  It 
further advocated that the less restrictive approaches are more 
fair and efficient because successor corporations are more able 
to predict, prevent, or absorb a loss due to a defective product.26 
In 2001, the Alaska Supreme Court embraced much of 
Redesigning Successor Liability’s analysis in adopting the 
  
Super. Ct. 1981)); and Washington (Martin v. Abbott Labs., 689 P.2d 368, 388 (Wash. 
1984)).  New York courts at the time held the successor liable if it sold the same 
product line sold by the predecessor or if it fell within the continuity of enterprise 
approach.  See, e.g., McCaffrey v. Weaver Jack Corp., No. CV 89-3910, 1992 WL 
266923, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 1992) (suggesting that New York has accepted 
continuity of enterprise); Rothstein v. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., 664 N.Y.S.2d 213, 220-21 
(Sup. Ct. 1997) (adopting the product line exception); Salvati v. Blaw-Knox Food & 
Chem. Equip., Inc., 497 N.Y.S.2d 242, 247 (Sup. Ct. 1985) (adopting continuity of 
enterprise).  For a discussion of New York’s current approach, see infra notes 99-114 
and accompanying text. 
 21 Approximately 100 million people reside in the eighteen states following 
the traditional approach.  See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE 
U.S. 28 (1997), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/www/statistical-abstract-
1995_2000.html (Population Table No. 26). 
 22 Of the 265 million people residing in the United States as of 1996, 113 
million lived in the thirteen states following one of the less restrictive approaches.  See 
id. 
 23 See Cupp, supra note 17, at 856 & n.70. 
 24 See id. at 845. 
 25 See id. at 867. 
 26 See id.  
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continuity of enterprise approach.27  Referring to the article’s 
“channeling back” argument, the court reasoned that the 
continuity of enterprise approach would “have the effect of 
encouraging existing corporations to produce safer products, in 
keeping with the public policy goals that underlie product 
liability law generally.”28  The court agreed that firms can 
protect themselves by negotiating a rational purchase price 
that reflects the potential successor liabilities, and by 
purchasing insurance where appropriate.29   
Thoughtful academic debate has followed the article’s 
publication.  In 2002, University of Chicago Professor Richard 
Epstein published a law review article expressing concern that 
adoption of the less restrictive approaches may not in fact 
“channel back” responsibility as asserted by Redesigning 
Successor Liability, but may instead lead corporations to 
liquidate or sell off assets piecemeal rather than sell to 
successors.  According to Professor Epstein: 
What is overlooked in Professor Cupp’s channeling argument is the 
possibility that the increased liability will result in scrubbing the 
transaction. . . . One possible way to defeat all products liability 
claims against successors is through a piecemeal disposition of the 
company.  Astute corporate owners could decide to sell off bits and 
pieces of the assets to different buyers, engage in partial liquidations 
or dividends to current shareholders, and then finally liquidate the 
rest.30 
University of South Carolina Professor Marie T. Reilly 
agreed with Epstein’s concerns in a 2003 law review article, 
opining that “Cupp’s model of the transferee as the least cost 
insurer of creditors’ loss misses an important limitation on the 
transferee’s capacity to channel or internalize creditors’ risk of 
loss to the debtor.”31   Both Epstein and Reilly also questioned 
Redesigning Successor Liability’s assessment of insurance 
availability, arguing in effect that in cases of unknowable 
claims, insurance is not a realistic option, so the monetary 
burden will simply be shifted onto the transferee corporation.32 
  
 27 See Savage Arms, Inc. v. W. Auto Supply Co., 18 P.3d 49, 55 nn.26 & 28, 56 
n.35, 57 nn.40 & 42, 58 nn.49 & 53-55 (Alaska 2001). 
 28 Id. at 58 n.49. 
 29 Id. at 57. 
 30 Richard A. Epstein, Imperfect Liability Regimes: Individual and Corporate 
Issues, 53 S.C. L. REV. 1153, 1170 (2002).  
 31 Marie T. Reilly, Making Sense of Successor Liability, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 
745, 790 (2003). 
 32 See infra notes 131-45 and accompanying text. 
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This article addresses those responses and re-tests 
Redesigning Successor Liability’s original theories and 
arguments.  Part I discusses courts’ rulings on successor 
liability since the publication of Redesigning Successor 
Liability.  The part provides an updated analysis of states’ 
current positions on successor liability and concludes that, 
contrary to the Restatement (Third)’s death predictions, courts 
continue to be split regarding the less restrictive approaches.  
Some jurisdictions are newly adopting them, and others are 
newly rejecting them. 
Part II re-visits Redesigning Successor Liability’s 
original arguments regarding the efficacy of the less restrictive 
approaches, and responds to the arguments’ critics.  The part 
discusses how the primary criticism leveled—that the less 
restrictive approaches unfairly impute liability where the risks 
were unknowable—appears to be flawed.  As recognized in the 
Restatement (Third), courts generally decline to assign liability 
based on imputed knowledge in products liability cases.33  
Indeed, the scholars who developed the theory of imputed 
knowledge of risks in strict liability—Dean John Wade and 
Dean Page Keeton—later in their careers both repudiated their 
creation.34  This part also discusses how, in any event, truly 
unknowable risks are rare.  Part III concludes that the 
continuity of enterprise and product line theories are neither 
dead to growth nor the subject of overwhelming judicial 
  
 33 See, e.g., Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470, 480 (Cal. 1988) (“While 
some decisions apply strict liability principles to such a [failure to warn] defect by 
holding that it is irrelevant whether the manufacturer knew of the danger or should 
have known, . . . most jurisdictions hold to the contrary.  That is, liability is conditioned 
on the actual or constructive knowledge of the risk by the manufacturer as of the time 
the product was sold or distributed.”); Anderson v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 810 
P.2d 549, 557 (Cal. 1987) (“[W]e hereby adopt the requirement, as propounded by the 
Restatement Second of Torts and acknowledged by the lower courts of this state and 
the majority of jurisdictions, that knowledge or knowability is a component of strict 
liability for failure to warn.”).  But see Johnson v. Raybestos Manhattan, Inc., 740 P.2d 
548, 549 (Haw. 1987) (“It is clear, therefore, that in a strict products liability action, 
the issue of whether the seller knew or reasonably should have known of the dangers 
inherent in his or her product is irrelevant to the issue of liability.”); Sternhagen v. 
Dow Co., 935 P.2d 1139, 1147 (Mont. 1997) (holding that “knowledge of any 
undiscovered or undiscoverable dangers should be imputed to the manufacturer,” 
although recognizing that a number of jurisdictions have held otherwise). 
 34 See W. Page Keeton, The Meaning of Defect in Products Liability Law—A 
Review of Basic Principles, 45 MO. L. REV. 579, 586-87 (1980); John W. Wade, On the 
Effect in Product Liability of Knowledge Unavailable Prior to Marketing, 58 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 734, 764 (1983) (“I now would be inclined to think that there is no longer any 
particular value in using the assumed-knowledge language.”). 
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rejection, and that despite critics’ concerns, these approaches 
continue to promote sound public policy.  
I.  A REDESIGN ONGOING: CONTINUING DIVISION IN THE 
NEW MILLENNIUM 
A.  Jurisdictions Recently Adopting One or Both of the Less 
Restrictive Approaches 
Contrary to the Restatement (Third)’s predictions, the 
new millennium has seen no developing consensus on 
approaches to successor products liability.  Some jurisdictions 
taking a clear position on the issue for the first time in the new 
millennium have adopted one or both of the less restrictive 
approaches.  For example, in 2001, four years after the 
Restatement (Third) pronounced the product line and 
continuity of enterprise approaches dead to growth, the Alaska 
Supreme Court in Savage Arms, Inc. v. Western Auto Supply 
Co. adopted and firmly supported the continuity of enterprise 
approach.35 
Savage Arms involved a lawsuit against the successor to 
the manufacturer of a defective rifle.  Jack Taylor sued Savage 
Industries after Taylor’s son was injured by a defective rifle 
originally manufactured by the company.36  Taylor later 
amended the suit to add Western Auto Supply Company, which 
had bought the rifle and sold it to a retail store in Maine.37  
Western Auto then brought a third-party claim for indemnity 
against Savage Arms, Inc., a corporation that had purchased 
assets of Savage Industries.38  After Western Auto settled with 
Taylor, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of 
Western Auto against Savage Arms, “holding Savage Arms 
liable as ‘the legal successor to Savage Industries, Inc.’”39   
Savage Arms petitioned the Alaska Supreme Court for 
review.40  The court granted the petition and framed the issue 
as follows:  whether “a corporation that purchases assets of the 
manufacturer of a rifle sold in Alaska [could] be held liable for 
  
 35 18 P.3d 49, 58 (Alaska 2001) (“We therefore adopt the ‘continuity of 
enterprise’ exception to the general rule of nonliability for corporate successors.”). 
 36 Id. at 51. 
 37 Id.  
 38 Id. 
 39 Id. at 52.  
 40 Id.  
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personal injury caused in Alaska by a defect in the rifle?”41  In 
addressing this issue, the Alaska Supreme Court formally 
adopted the continuity of enterprise approach to successor 
liability.42   
The court referred extensively to Redesigning Successor 
Liability in adopting the approach, citing it seven times in a 
nine page opinion.43  Referencing the article, the court reasoned 
that the continuity of enterprise approach encourages “existing 
corporations to produce safer products.”44  The court also 
adopted the article’s reasoning that the approach “will give 
manufacturing corporations additional incentives to market 
non-defective products, in order to maximize the corporations’ 
market value in event of sale.”45 
Again citing to Redesigning Successor Liability, the 
court debunked the potential counterargument that the 
continuity of enterprise approach would “discourage large-scale 
transfers so long as anticipated successor liabilities do not 
exceed the value of the corporation’s accumulated goodwill.”46  
Instead, the court concluded that the purchasing corporation 
will merely take the potential liability into account in 
determining purchase price and insurance coverage.47  The 
court also rejected the Restatement (Third)’s assumption that 
the continuity of enterprise approach results in a windfall for 
claimants, noting that recovery for legitimate injuries is not a 
windfall.48  Finally, the court discounted the argument that 
successor liability conflicts with maximizing bankruptcy 
estates, reasoning that bankruptcy creditors do not deserve 
priority over injured tort claimants.49  Although the court 
ultimately reversed the summary judgment order and 
remanded the case to the trial court, it did so to allow the trial 
court to consider “the ‘mere continuation’ and ‘continuity of 
enterprise’ exceptions in the context of this case.”50 
  
 41 Savage Arms, 18 P.3d at 52.  
 42 Id. at 55.  
 43 Id. at 55 n.26, 57 nn.40 & 42, 58 nn.49 & 53-55. 
 44 Id. at 58. 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. at 56-57. 
 47 Savage Arms, 18 P.3d at 57-58. 
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. at 57. 
 50 Id. at 58 (an additional reason for the court’s reversal was the existence of 
unresolved factual issues).  
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The Alaska Supreme Court addressed the product line 
approach in the same opinion.51  Although the court declined to 
reach the issue of whether it would adopt the product line 
approach due to the particular facts of the case before it, the 
court left that door open:  “Our decision today does not preclude 
further consideration of this [product line] exception in an 
appropriate case.”52    
The continuity of enterprise approach appears likely to 
remain the law for some time in Alaska.  In 2002, Alaska 
Attorney General Bruce Botelho wrote an opinion letter to 
Alaska Governor Tony Knowles regarding a legislative bill 
designed “to reject the continuity of enterprise exception to the 
doctrine of successor liability adopted in [Savage Arms].”53  
Attorney General Botelho recommended that the bill be 
vetoed.54  The Attorney General’s opinion cited, among other 
things, the legitimacy of the Savage Arms opinion, and the 
interest in maintaining a remedy for injured plaintiffs: 
From a policy perspective, we think that the balance established by 
the Savage Arms court is more appropriate than that established by 
the Products Liability Restatement as codified in the bill.  We think 
that the modest expansion of the scope of successor liability 
announced by the Savage Arms court was a legitimate decision by 
the court and do not think it should be disturbed.  This decision will 
help to ensure that injured plaintiffs have a viable remedy when 
companies that sold defective products sell their assets and 
liquidate.55 
Ultimately, the bill attacking Savage Arms did not pass, and 
the continuity of enterprise approach remains good law in 
Alaska.56  
In 2001, the same year Alaska adopted the continuity of 
enterprise approach, Mississippi adopted the product line 
approach to successor liability.57  In Huff v. Shopsmith, Inc., 
Huff filed suit against Shopsmith, among others, for injuries 
she suffered due to an allegedly defective “Mark V” power 
  
 51 Id. at 55. 
 52 Id. at 55 n.25. 
 53 Letter from Bruce M. Botelho, Alaska Attorney Gen., to Tony Knowles, 
Governor of Alaska (June 11, 2002), available at http://www.law.state.ak.us/pdf/ 
opinions/883020095.pdf. 
 54 Id.  
 55 Id. 
 56 The bill appears to have died in the House Judiciary Committee.  See H.B. 
13, 23d Leg., 1st Sess (Alaska 2003).  
 57 Huff v. Shopsmith, Inc., 786 So. 2d 383, 388 (Miss. 2001) (“[W]e view the 
product line theory as a viable basis for recovery.”). 
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tool.58  Huff alleged that Shopsmith was liable as the successor 
corporation of the tool’s manufacturer.59  After summary 
judgment was entered in favor of Shopsmith,60 Huff urged the 
Mississippi Supreme Court on appeal to adopt the product line 
approach.61  Ultimately, the court viewed the product line 
theory as a viable basis for recovery.62  As to Huff’s claim, 
however, the court recognized that the facts of the particular 
case did not meet the product line approach’s requirements.63  
Two years later, in Paradise Corp. v. Amerihost Dev., 
Inc., the Mississippi Supreme Court noted that the product line 
approach is premised on:  (1) the successor corporation’s 
superior position to assume the obligation of risk-spreading, 
and (2) “the idea of estoppel and principles of fairness that a 
corporation that benefits from the goodwill of a predecessor’s 
product should also bear the burden of liabilities attached to 
the product as well.”64  In that same 2003 opinion, the court 
adopted the continuity of enterprise approach, not in the 
context of products liability, but rather with respect to “debts 
owed by the predecessor when the successor takes on the 
identity of the predecessor company in every way except taking 
responsibility for the predecessor’s debts.”65  The court did not 
dispute, however, the Fifth Circuit’s application of the 
continuity of enterprise approach in Mozingo v. Correct Mfg. 
Corp., a products liability case involving Mississippi law.66  
Indeed, Paradise Corp. cites to the Mozingo opinion for law on 
corporate successor liability, including the continuity of 
enterprise approach.67 
Although no Connecticut appellate courts have yet ruled 
on the issue, a Connecticut Superior Court in 1999 adopted the 
product line approach in the context of a successor products 
liability claim arising from injuries sustained from a fall from 
  
 58 Id. at 385. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. 
 61 Id. at 387. 
 62 Id. at 388. 
 63 Huff, 786 So. 2d at 388. 
 64 848 So. 2d 177, 180 (Miss. 2003) (citing Mozingo v. Correct Mfg. Corp., 752 
F.2d 168, 175 (5th Cir. 1985)). 
 65 Id. at 180-81. 
 66 See 752 F.2d 168, 174-76 (5th Cir. 1985) (recognizing a lack of clear 
authority from Mississippi on corporate successor liability, but holding that the district 
court did not err by instructing the jury on continuity of enterprise). 
 67 See Paradise Corp., 848 So. 2d at 179-80 (citing Mozingo, 752 F.2d at 174-
75)). 
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an allegedly defective ladder.68  In Pastorick v. Lyn-Lad Truck 
Racks, Inc., the court, in the context of an appeal from the 
granting of a motion for summary judgment, addressed 
whether a successor corporation could be held liable when it 
neither manufactured nor sold an allegedly defective ladder.69 
In finding that the successor corporation could be held 
liable despite having neither manufactured nor sold the 
ladder,70 the court adopted the product line approach but 
remanded in order to determine whether the requirements of 
this approach had been satisfied.71  The court reasoned that, as 
a policy matter, successor liability “is a continuation of the 
basic principle that between an injured consumer and a 
business entity the latter is best able to absorb and to pass off 
to, the body of customers, the general public, through pricing, 
the cost of personal injury sustained by ordinary citizens.”72  
Otherwise, “the injured party has no defense to the risk of non-
compensation from a voluntarily defunct seller.”73 
The Savage Arms, Huff, and Pastorick opinions 
demonstrate that in the new millennium the product line and 
continuity of enterprise approaches are neither dead to growth 
nor the subject of overwhelming judicial rejection.  On the 
  
 68 Pastorick v. Lyn-Lad Truck Racks, Inc., No. CV 960562426S, 1999 WL 
608674, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 3, 1999) (unpublished).  Three Connecticut lower 
courts had already adopted the same approach.  See Sullivan v. A.W. Flint Co., No. CV 
920339263, 1996 WL 469716, at *7-8 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug 5, 1996); Kennedy v. 
Oshkosh Truck Corp., No. CV92 0510394S, 1995 WL 27400, at *2, *4 (Conn. Super. Ct. 
Jan. 18, 1995); Copperthite v. Pytlik, No. 59053, 1992 WL 209660, at *4 (Conn. Super. 
Ct. Aug. 25, 1992).  At least one other Connecticut Superior Court has recognized the 
product line approach without explicitly adopting it.  See Sizer v. Goss Int’l, No. 
CV030825035, 2005 WL 1023244 at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 31. 2005) (“Connecticut 
courts have recognized, however, an exception to the general rule referred to as the 
‘product line continuation’ exception to successor liability.”). 
 69 Pastorick, 1999 WL 608674 at *1. 
 70 Id. (“The defendant moves for summary judgment. Its position is that it did 
not sell the product nor did it manufacturer the product. There appears to be no 
controversy as to manufacture and sale, as the complaint clearly reveals that the 
manufacturer and original seller was A.W. Flint Company.”). 
 71 Id. at *1-2 (“Although no Connecticut appeals court has specifically dealt 
with the ‘product line continuation’ avenue of liability, this court is of the opinion that 
there is a sound legal basis for the application of the product line continuation theory of 
liability in this State. . . . It is not clear as to whether the defendant continued to 
produce the same product line as did the Flint Company.”). 
 72 Id. at *2. 
 73 Id. at *3. 
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contrary, courts continue to adopt74 and apply75 the less 
restrictive approaches to successor liability cases.   
Other courts also may be headed that direction, but 
have not yet committed.  For example, an Indiana appellate 
court addressed the pros and cons of the product line approach 
in Guerrero v. Allison Engine Co.76  The court went so far as to 
state that “[t]he product line exception may be an appropriate 
means by which to balance the seemingly juxtaposed concepts 
of strict liability under the Indiana Product Liability Act, and 
freedom of contract—long supported by common law, as well as 
both state and federal constitutions.”77  However, the court 
stopped short of adopting the product line approach because 
the specific factual circumstances before the court did not 
justify imposition of successor liability.78  Tellingly, at least one 
Indiana court has since cited Guerrero for the proposition that 
“Indiana recognizes the product line successor theory of 
liability in products liability cases under certain 
circumstances.”79  Professor George Kuney recently predicted 
that “[b]ased on the Guerrero court’s favorable treatment of the 
product line exception, the Indiana Court of Appeals probably 
will adopt the product line exception when it is presented with 
the appropriate factual record.”80 
South Dakota is another example of a jurisdiction that 
may at some point move toward the less restrictive approaches.  
In a non-products liability case, in which the court analyzed 
only one of the traditional approaches to successor liability, the 
South Dakota Supreme Court acknowledged that successor 
liability in products liability cases had expanded, and noted the 
reasons why this expansion had occurred:  
  
 74 See Huff v. Shopsmith, Inc., 786 So. 2d 383, 388 (Miss. 2001); Savage 
Arms, Inc. v. Western Auto Supply, 18 P.3d 49, 58 (Alaska 2000); Pastorick, 1999 WL 
608674, at *2. 
 75 The last six years have seen various courts that had previously adopted the 
“continuity of enterprise” or “product line” approach continue to acknowledge or apply 
one or both of these less restrictive approaches.  See, e.g., Dillman v. Indiana Rolls, 
Inc., 67 Pa. D. & C.4th 294, 301 (Pa. Com. Pl. 2004) (“The foregoing facts, as well as the 
entire record developed in this case, clearly bring Park squarely within the product line 
exception.”). 
 76 725 N.E.2d 479, 483-87 (Ind. App. 2000). 
 77 Id. at 487. 
 78 Id. 
 79 P.R. Mallory & Co., v. American States Ins. Co., No. 54C01-0005-CP-
00156, 2004 WL 1737489, at *6 (Ind. Cir. Ct. Jul. 29, 2004). 
 80 George W. Kuney, A Taxonomy and Evaluation of Successor Liability, 6 
FLA. ST. U. BUS. REV. (forthcoming 2007) (manuscript at 97), available at 
http://www.corpgovcenter.org/Research2006/SuccessKun2006.pdf. 
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All these exceptions . . . have, however, undergone some expansion 
under the law of products liability.  Strict liability in tort for 
defective products applies regardless of negligence or privity.  
Liability for defective products rests on the need to compensate 
eligible plaintiffs; thus, the burden of economic loss is shifted not 
just to the manufacturer of the defective product, but also at times to 
the successor manufacturer who by purchasing assets from the 
predecessor is able to continue making the same or similar 
products.81 
Georgia may also be a candidate for formally adopting 
one of the less restrictive approaches.  Professor Kuney 
recently described a 1998 Georgia case not included in 
Redesigning Successor Liability’s jurisdiction count as evidence 
that Georgia has “implicitly accepted the product line 
exception.”82  Finally, in 2001, a federal district court hinted 
  
 81 Parker v. Western Dakota Insurors, Inc., 605 N.W.2d 181, 185 (S.D. 2000).  
The Parker case was one involving a contract dispute, so the court did not have the 
opportunity to rule on the viability of the less restrictive approaches in a products 
liability context.  See id. (“Yet, these strict liability concepts created for the protection 
of injured persons do not have the same expansive application in a purely contractual 
dispute. In this case, we deal only with the interpretation of contracts to decide 
whether by purchasing assets Western Dakota became responsible for First American’s 
liability to its employee.”). 
 82 Kuney, supra note 80 (manuscript at 90).  Professor Kuney’s article 
provides a laudably thorough state-by-state analysis of general (i.e., not segregating 
products liability cases in his analysis) successor liability rulings.  Although his 
interpretations of state’s positions are in most instances supportive of the count 
developed in this article and in Redesigning Successor Liability, with a few cases the 
interpretations differ.  For example, Professor Kuney follows the Restatement (Third) 
in counting Massachusetts and Ohio as jurisdictions following the traditional approach, 
whereas this article counts them as jurisdictions that have not firmly committed to any 
particular approach.  These jurisdictions’ approaches are discussed in Redesigning 
Successor Liability as follows: 
Regarding Massachusetts, the Restatement (Third) cites Guzman v. 
MRM/Elgin, 567 N.E.2d 929 (Mass. 1991), as adopting the traditional 
approach.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIABILITY § 12 cmt. c. 
Reporters’ Notes (1997), Reporters’ Notes.  However, Guzman only rejected 
the product line approach, 567 N.E.2d at 929-30, and did not address the 
continuity of enterprise approach.  In McCarthy v. Litton Industries Inc., 570 
N.E.2d 1008, 1013 (Mass. 1991), a later case not cited by the Restatement 
(Third), the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court discussed the continuity 
of enterprise approach, but stated that the facts before the court did not 
require it to adopt or reject the approach. 
Regarding Ohio, the Restatement (Third) cites Welco Industries Inc. v. 
Applied Co., 617 N.E.2d 1129 (Ohio 1993), as adopting the traditional 
approach.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 12 cmt. c, Reporters’ Notes.  However, 
in Welco, the Ohio Supreme Court actually appears receptive to use of the 
continuity of enterprise approach in products liability cases.  See 617 N.E.2d 
at 1133 (“However valid the justifications for expanding the liability of 
successor corporations in products liability cases, [they] do not apply here.”).  
The court noted that the facts before it in Welco did not involve products 
liability, and the court rejected use of the continuity of enterprise approach in 
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that Nevada may follow California’s lead on issues regarding 
successor liability (which presumably would include adoption of 
the product line approach, although the approach was not 
discussed in the opinion).83  In 2005, the Nevada Supreme 
Court, in a non-products liability negligence case, expressly left 
open the question of whether it would adopt the continuity of 
enterprise approach in a products liability case.84  However, the 
decision, Village Builders 96, L.P. v. U.S. Laboratories, 
expressed some concern about potential expansion.85  It cited a 
California case that referred to a 1998 Practicing Law Institute 
article arguing that the trend was against expansion.86  As 
demonstrated in Redesigning Successor Liability a year later, 
in 1999, in reality there has not been a trend against expansion 
in cases involving products liability claims.87   
This confusion about trend directions may result to 
some extent from analyses combining product liability cases 
and cases not involving products issues.  Obviously the product 
line approach would not be nearly as compelling in successor 
liability cases not involving defective products, and thus 
combining products liability cases and other successor liability 
cases adds a number of situations in which one of the two 
major expansive approaches is not generally even considered, 
much less rejected.  Further, products liability cases have 
aspects that may make the less restrictive approaches more 
  
breach of contract cases as opposed to products liability cases.  See id.  In an 
earlier case, the Ohio Supreme Court rejected the product line approach in a 
products liability case, but appeared receptive to the continuity of enterprise 
approach.  Flaugher v. Cone Automatic Mach. Co., 507 N.E.2d 331, 336-37 
(Ohio 1987) (discussing continuity of enterprise, but finding it not applicable 
under the facts of the case).  In 1992, an Ohio court interpreted Flaugher as 
having adopted the continuity of enterprise approach.  See Davis v. Loopco 
Indus., No. 59594, 1992 WL 2590, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 9, 1992) 
(“We . . . find that the Flaugher court adopted the expanded test.”). 
Cupp, supra note 17, at 853 n.42. 
 83 Roll v. Tracor, Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1073, 1082 (D. Nev. 2001) (“In Nevada 
the State Supreme Court has not had occasion to consider the issue of successor 
liability.  It is reasonable to expect, however, that in a torts case the Nevada Supreme 
Court would follow the lead of the California Supreme Court on this issue, because in 
the area of products liability the Nevada Court has adopted nearly every holding of the 
California Court.”). 
 84 Village Builders 96, L.P. v. U.S. Labs., Inc., 112 P.3d 1082, 1091 (Nev. 
2005).  
 85 Id. 
 86 Id. (quoting Monarch Bay II v. Prof’l Serv. Indus., Inc., 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
778, 781 (1999), which cites Pollak, Successor Liability in Asset Aquisitions in 
Acquiring or Selling the Privately Held Company, PRAC. L. INST. 77, 99, 101 (1998)). 
 87 See Cupp, supra note 17, at 852-58. 
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attractive to some jurisdictions than they are in non-products 
cases—for example, liability without fault is typically extended 
to products cases but not to most other types of cases that may 
involve successor liability.  
In addition to new jurisdictions explicitly adopting or 
favorably citing one or both of the less restrictive approaches to 
successor liability, the last six years have seen at least one 
court applying a continuity of enterprise approach, but 
disguised under the name of the more traditional “mere 
continuation” theory.88  In Roper Elec. Co. v. Quality Castings, 
Inc., a Missouri appellate court recognized that “identity of the 
officers, directors, and shareholders for both corporations 
(although a substantial factor) is not a precursor to invocation 
of the ‘corporate continuation’ doctrine.”89  However, in 
concluding that the successor corporation was a corporate 
continuation of the predecessor, the Missouri court looked to 
factors sounding more in “continuity of enterprise,” including, 
among other things, the fact that the successor “continued the 
exact same business using the same equipment and had the 
same customers as [the predecessor], but never notified them of 
the change, utilized the same trade name . . . took over the 
works in progress of [the predecessor], collected the accounts 
receivable, operated in the same location, and had the same 
phone number as [the predecessor].”90 
Tellingly, the Roper court held that a lack of continuity 
of ownership is not necessary to a finding of “mere 
continuation,” despite the fact that the lack of continuity of 
ownership is what classically differentiates the continuity of 
enterprise approach from the “mere continuation” theory.91  By 
  
 88 Roper Elec. Co. v. Quality Castings, Inc., 60 S.W.3d 708, 711 (Mo. Ct. App. 
2001).  
 89 Id. at 712. 
 90 Id. at 713. 
 91 See, e.g., Winsor v. Glasswerks PHX, LLC, 63 P.3d 1040, 1046 (Ariz. Ct. 
App. 2003) (“The focus of the continuity of enterprise exception is to expand the 
traditional ‘mere continuation’ exception that is part of the general rule.  The 
traditional ‘mere continuation’ exception applies ‘only when there is a common identity 
of officers, directors and stock between the selling and purchasing corporations, and 
only one corporation after the transfer.’”); Pancrantz v. Monsanto Co., 547 N.W.2d 198, 
201 (Iowa 1996) (“Under the expanded approach to the mere continuation exception,  
the focus is on the continuity of the seller’s business operation and not the continuity of 
its management and ownership.”); see also Nilsson v. Cont’l Mach. Mfg. Co., 251 621 
N.E.2d 1032, 1034 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (refusing to recognize the “mere continuation” 
approach where no continuity of ownership, including continuity of stock ownership 
existed).  Other jurisdictions requiring continuity of shareholders for application of the 
“mere continuation” approach include Colorado (CMCB Enter. v. Ferguson, 114 P.3d 90 
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looking instead to factors such as the continuing business 
operations, the Missouri court has, in essence, adopted a 
continuity of enterprise theory.  This may not come as a 
surprise, as other courts have recognized the potential among 
courts to take such an approach.  As stated by the Third Circuit 
in Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Hercules, Inc., “One may retain the 
traditional exceptions but expand their boundaries, so that 
‘merger’ or ‘continuation’ are held to include cases they once 
would not have included.”92   
Although Roper is not a products liability case, but 
rather a suit for payment of services, the court did not limit the 
holding to service contract cases.93  The court even relied on a 
successor products liability case to support its holding.94  That 
products liability case, Ray v. Alad Corp., is the case most 
commonly cited as spawning one of the less restrictive 
approaches, the product line approach.95   
Whether Missouri will ultimately follow its 
pronouncements in Roper in a products liability context 
remains to be seen.  For now, the authors do not count Missouri 
  
(Colo. 2005) (“The mere continuation exception applies when there is a continuation of 
directors, management, and shareholder interest and, in some cases, inadequate 
consideration.”));  Illinois (Vernon v. Schuster, 688 N.E.2d 1172, 1176 (Ill. 1997) (“[T]he 
majority of courts considering this exception emphasize a common identity of officers, 
directors, and stock between the selling and purchasing corporation as the key element 
of a ‘continuation.’”) (quoting Tucker v. Paxton Mach. Co., 645 F.2d 620, 625-26 (8th 
Cir. 1981))); New Mexico (Garcia v. Coe Mfg., Inc., 933 P.2d 243, 247 (N.M. 1997) 
(“Generally, a continuation of the transferor corporation occurs where there is (1) a 
continuity of directors, officers, and shareholders; (2) continued existence of only one 
corporation after sale of the assets; and (3) inadequate consideration for the sale of the 
assets.”)); Ohio (McGaw v. S. Bend Lathe, Inc., 598 N.E.2d 18 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991) (“An 
asset purchase is subject to the legal consequences of a merger under the de facto 
merger exception if: (1) there is a continuation of the enterprise of the seller in terms of 
continuity of management, personnel, physical location, assets, and operations; (2) 
there is a continuity of shareholders, accomplished by payment for the assets with 
shares of stock; (3) the seller ceases operations, liquidates, and dissolves as soon as 
legally and practically possible; and (4) the purchasing corporation assumes the 
obligations of the seller necessary for the uninterrupted continuation of business 
operations.”)); and Utah (Decius v. Action Collection Svc., Inc., 105 P.3d 956, 959 (Utah 
Ct. App. 2004) (noting in an employment discrimination case that “the ‘mere 
continuation,’ considers not whether the ‘business operations’ continued, but whether 
the ‘corporate entity’ continued. . . . A continuation demands ‘a common identity of 
stock, directors, and stockholders and the existence of only one corporation at the 
completion of the transfer’”)). 
 92 Phila. Elec. Co. v. Hercules, Inc., 762 F.2d 303, 312 (3d Cir. 1985) 
(negligence and nuisance environmental cleanup lawsuit).  
 93 See, e.g., Roper, 60 S.W.3d at 712.  
 94 Id. (citing Ray v. Alad Corp., 560 P.2d 3 (Cal. 1977)). 
 95 See Nilsson v. Cont’l Mach. Mfg. Co., 621 N.E.2d 1032, 1035 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1993) (recognizing that the product line approach was “first espoused by the California 
Supreme Court in Ray”). 
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as having adopted the continuity of enterprise approach.  Time 
will tell, however, if Missouri continues to reject the continuity 
of enterprise by name, but applies it in principle through an 
expanded “mere continuation” test.  Time will also tell if other 
courts follow suit.96 
As addressed below, New York recently rejected the 
product line approach.97  However, a New York court also 
recently hinted at overlap between the traditional approach 
and the less restrictive continuity of enterprise approach.  In 
the case In re Seventh Judicial Dist. Asbestos Litigation, a New 
York Supreme Court noted:  “Assuming that the exception, 
under Schumacher, pertaining to merger and consolidation 
would encompass ‘de facto merger,’ and further that there is no 
one factor, including continuity of ownership, which is 
determinative on that issue, there is very little, if any, 
distinction between the exceptions of ‘continuity of enterprise’ 
and consolidation and merger.”98 
B.  Jurisdictions Recently Rejecting One or More of the Less 
Restrictive Approaches  
Although not all courts addressing the issue of corporate 
successor liability in the last six years have adopted the 
continuity of enterprise or products line approaches, those 
courts for the first time rejecting either of these approaches in 
favor of the traditional approach in products liability cases 
have been few.  The most prominent of the few jurisdictions 
rejecting one of the less restrictive successor liability 
approaches for the first time in the new millennium is New 
York.  In Semenetz v. Sherling & Walden, Inc., the Court of 
Appeals of New York expressly declined to address the viability 
of the continuity of enterprise approach under the facts of the 
case at hand, but it rejected the product line approach.99  
  
 96 The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit recently certified 
to the Utah Supreme Court the questions of whether the product line and/or continuity 
of enterprise approaches apply in Utah.  Tabor v. The Metal Ware Corp., Nos. 05-4155 
and 05-4156, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 14793, at *2 (10th Cir. May 26, 2006). 
 97 See infra notes 99-114 and accompanying text. 
 98 In re Seventh Judicial Dist. Asbestos Litig., 788 N.Y.S.2d 579, 583 (Sup. 
Ct. 2005).  There are other examples of the fluidity of the different approaches.  See, 
e.g., Gladstone v. Stuart Cinemas, Inc., 878 A.2d 214, 221-22 n.4 (Vt. 2005) (in a case to 
collect a debt, recognizing that “[a]s they have evolved, there is little difference 
between the de facto merger exception and the mere continuation exception. . . . We 
view the name of the exception as unimportant.” (citations omitted)). 
 99 851 N.E.2d 1170 (N.Y. 2006). 
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Semenetz involved an Alabama corporation selling an 
allegedly defective and injury-causing sawmill to Semenetz 
Lumber Mill, Inc.100  After the accident but before the plaintiff 
commenced a products liability action, the Alabama 
corporation sold most of its assets to a successor corporation 
with an express waiver of all liabilities.101  The successor 
corporation moved for summary judgment, asserting, among 
other things, that successor liability should not apply.102  When 
the motion eventually reached New York’s high court, it 
declined to follow the line of lower New York cases supporting 
the product line approach, and it rejected the doctrine.103  
The court’s rejection of the product line approach was 
based largely on apparent misperceptions.  One is that the 
product line approach threatens “economic annihilation for 
small businesses [b]ecause [they] have limited assets.”104  In 
reaching this conclusion, the court neglected to note that, as 
addressed below, liability may be channeled back to the 
predecessor corporation through a lower purchase price 
discounted by the amount needed to purchase insurance 
against foreseeable risks, and that insurance protection 
appears to be readily available for successor liability 
lawsuits.105 
The court also cited the Restatement (Third)’s argument 
that “adoption of the ‘product line’ exception would mark ‘a 
radical change from existing law implicating complex economic 
considerations best left to be addressed by the Legislature.’”106  
This reasoning is misguided for several reasons.  First, as 
described in Redesigning Successor Liability, the Restatement 
(Third) was simply wrong in its assertion that only a small 
minority of jurisdictions follow one or both of the less 
restrictive approaches.107  Rather, the number of jurisdictions 
adopting one or both of the less restrictive approaches is in the 
same ballpark as the number of jurisdictions following the 
  
 100 Id. at 1171. 
 101 Id. at 1171-72. 
 102 Id. at 1172. 
 103  Id. 
 104 Id. (quoting Bernard v. Kee Mfg. Co., 409 So. 2d 1047, 1049 (Fla. 1982)). 
 105 See infra notes 190-91 and accompanying text.  
 106 Semenetz, 851 N.E.2d at 1175 (quoting City of New York v. Pfizer & Co., 
260 A.D.2d 174, 176 (N.Y. App. 1999) (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  PRODS. 
LIAB. § 12 cmt. 6 & Reporters’ Note)). 
 107 See Cupp, supra note 17, at 852-58; see also supra notes 17-23 and 
accompanying text. 
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restrictive traditional approach.108  Thus, it is not a “radical 
departure” to utilize the product line approach, and there 
appears to be no evidence that the product line approach has 
caused significant problems for small (or large) businesses in 
California, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Washington, or any of 
the other often-sizable jurisdictions that utilize the approach. 
Further, the leave-it-to-the-legislature argument, while 
wise in many other contexts, represents particularly bad public 
policy in this context.  For more than thirty years legislatures 
have failed to heed calls for effective and fair statutory 
approaches to successor liability.109  A significant factor in the 
failure of legislation is the “race to the bottom” motivation 
inherent in potential successor liability laws.  As noted in 
Redesigning Successor Liability: 
Unless almost all states enact effective legislation, corporate 
managers determined to dissolve and to eliminate tort liability for 
future products liability claims could simply reincorporate in 
another state that does not provide effective protection for long-tail 
claimants.  They could then dissolve in the more business-friendly 
state, avoiding future liability.  Individual states that enact 
legislation adequately protecting victims of defective products would 
risk chasing away businesses to other states. . . . The pressure to 
race to the bottom to favor corporations might be even greater in 
legislation not involving dissolution.110  
Further, while the business community has effective lobbying 
ability, “[t]he lobby for long-tail . . . claimants is exceedingly 
weak.”111  The problem of an absence of successor liability, if 
thought about at all, would likely appear technical and complex 
to the average consumer, and thus potential defective product 
victims are politically unlikely to clamor for fair laws.112  
Finally, it is important to note that the traditional approach to 
successor liability is a common law creation of the courts, not 
the legislatures.113  Courts are less likely to intrude upon 
legislative authority when reversing harmful public policy 
consequences caused by their own common law creations. 
Thus, New York’s rationale for its rejection of the 
product line approach is questionable.  It is worth noting again 
  
 108 See supra notes 17-23 and accompanying text. 
 109 See Cupp, supra note 17, at 879-81. 
 110 Id. at 881-82 (citations omitted). 
 111 Green, supra note 11, at 59. 
 112 See Cupp, supra note 17, at 883. 
 113 See id. at 877-78. 
1194 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:4 
that the Court of Appeals declined to decide whether the 
continuity of enterprise approach will be adopted in New York, 
because the plaintiff did not rely upon continuity of enterprise 
in her appeal.114  However, based on its reasoning in rejecting 
the product line approach, the future of continuity of enterprise 
in New York is questionable as well. 
In addition to New York, the Kentucky Supreme Court 
refused to adopt the product line approach in 2002, but it did 
not consider the continuity of enterprise approach.115  The next 
year, the New Hampshire Supreme Court indicated that it 
would not recognize the continuity of enterprise approach.116  
Since 1999, only these courts have in published state appellate 
or federal decisions considered and for the first time clearly 
rejected either the product line or continuity of enterprise 
approach in favor of the traditional approach to successor 
liability in products liability cases.117  Of these states, Kentucky 
was already considered by many—including the Restatement 
(Third)118—to have rejected the less restrictive approaches 
based on a 1987 Sixth Circuit opinion applying Kentucky law.119 
The number of states that have for the first time clearly 
adopted the product line or continuity of enterprise approach in 
the new millennium is about the same as the number that have 
adopted the traditional approach for the first time.  Although 
Professor Richard Epstein opposes the trend, he agrees that 
  
 114 Semenetz v. Sherling & Walden, Inc., 851 N.E.2d 1170, 1173 n.2 (N.Y. 
2006). 
 115 Pearson ex rel. Trent v. Nat’l Feeding Sys., Inc., 90 S.W.3d 46, 52 (Ky. 
2002). 
 116 Bielagus v. EMRE of New Hampshire Corp., 826 A.2d 559, 568-69 (N.H. 
2003).  The Bielagus case regarded debts owed on a promissory note, but the court 
noted that the continuity of enterprise approach would not apply in tort (including 
products liability) or contract cases.   See id.  
 117 In 2003, an Arizona appellate court declined to apply the continuity of 
enterprise and product line approaches, but rather deferred to the state legislature to 
determine whether the less restrictive approaches would become part of the fabric of 
Arizona law.  See Winsor v. Glasswerks PHX, L.L.C., 63 P.3d 1040, 1046-48 (Ariz. Ct. 
App. 2003).  In 2005, the South Carolina Supreme Court applied the traditional factors 
in determining successor liability, but did not consider (and therefore did not reject) the 
less restrictive approaches.  See Simmons v. Mark Lift Indus., Inc., 622 S.E.2d 213, 215 
(S.C. 2005); id. at 216-17 (Burnett, J., dissenting).  Interestingly, South Carolina 
passed a statute in 2006 limiting successor liability in asbestos litigation to the fair 
market value of the total gross assets of the transferor determined as of the time of the 
merger or consolidation.  S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-81-140 (Cum. Supp. 2006). 
 118 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  PRODS. LIAB. § 12 cmt. c. (1997). 
 119 See Conn v. Fales Div. of Mathewson Corp., 835 F.2d 145 (6th Cir. 1987) 
(applying Kentucky law). 
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jurisdictions continue to adopt the less restrictive 
approaches.120   
An updated count of jurisdictions applying the different 
approaches confirms that the judicial landscape remains 
varied.  As of mid-2006, nineteen states have clearly adopted 
the traditional approach to determining successor products 
liability.121  Twelve states have unequivocally adopted either 
the continuity of enterprise and/or the product line approach.122  
Five of these states follow the continuity of enterprise 
approach.123  Six states follow the product line approach.124  One 
  
 120 Epstein, supra note 30, at 1168-69 (referring to “the [growing] minority of 
cases that take one of two less restrictive positions on successor liability”); see also 
Proof of Facts § 2, 46 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 2D (2004) (“[I]t appears that the 
number of jurisdictions adopting an expanded version of the “mere continuation” 
approach is increasing.”). 
 121 The count includes states that adopted the traditional approach through 
either state supreme court decisions, lower court decisions, or federal court decisions 
attempting to apply state law.  The count includes New Hampshire, even though the 
pertinent case was not a products liability case, based on the court’s indicating it was 
rejecting the continuity of enterprise approach even in products liability cases.  That 
being said, the nineteen states include Arkansas (Swayze v. A.O. Smith Corp., 694 F. 
Supp. 619, 622-24 (E.D. Ark. 1988) (applying Arkansas law)); Colorado (Johnston v. 
Amsted Indus., Inc., 830 P.2d 1141, 1142-43, 1146-47 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992)); Florida 
(Bernard v. Kee Mfg. Co., 409 So. 2d 1047, 1049, 1051 (Fla. 1982)); Illinois (Nilsson v. 
Cont’l Mach. Mfg. Co., 621 N.E.2d 1032, 1034-35 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993)); Iowa (Pancratz v. 
Monsanto Co., 547 N.W.2d 198, 199-202 (Iowa 1996)); Kentucky (Conn, 835 F.2d at 
146; Pearson ex rel. Trent v. Nat’l Feeding Sys., Inc., 90 S.W.3d 46, 52 (Ky. 2002)); 
Maryland (Nissen Corp. v. Miller, 594 A.2d 564, 573 (Md. 1991)); Minnesota (Niccum v. 
Hydra Tool Corp., 438 N.W.2d 96, 98-100 (Minn. 1989)); Missouri (Chem. Design, Inc. 
v. Am. Standard, Inc., 847 S.W.2d 488, 491-93 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993)); Nebraska (Jones v. 
Johnson Mach. & Press Co., 320 N.W.2d 481, 483-84 (Neb. 1982)); New Hampshire 
(Bielagus, 826 A.2d at 568-69 (rejecting continuity of enterprise), Simoneau v. S. Bend 
Lathe, Inc., 543 A.2d 407, 407 (N.H. 1988) (rejecting product line approach)); North 
Carolina (Budd Tire Corp. v. Pierce Tire Co., 370 S.E.2d 267, 269-70 (N.C. Ct. App. 
1988)); North Dakota (Downtowner Inc. v. Acrometal Prods., 347 N.W.2d 118, 121, 124-
25 (N.D. 1984)); Oklahoma (Pulis v. U.S. Elec. Tool Co., 561 P.2d 68, 69-71 (Okla. 
1977)); Texas (Mudgett v. Paxson Mach. Co., 709 S.W.2d 755, 758-59 (Tex. Ct. App. 
1986)); Vermont (Ostrowski v. Hydra-Tool Corp., 479 A.2d 126, 127 (Vt. 1984)); 
Virginia (Harris v. T.I., Inc., 413 S.E.2d 605, 609-10 (Va. 1992)); West Virginia (Davis 
v. Celotex Corp., 420 S.E.2d 557, 562-63 (W. Va. 1992)); and Wisconsin (Fish v. Amsted 
Indus., 376 N.W.2d 820, 823, 825 (Wis. 1985)). 
 122 Again, the count includes states that adopted the less restrictive 
approaches through either state supreme court decisions, lower court decisions, or 
federal court decisions attempting to apply state law.  For a listing of the states, see 
infra notes 123-25 and accompanying text. 
 123 States following the continuity of enterprise approach include Alabama 
(Asher v. KCS Int’l, Inc., 659 So. 2d 598, 600 (Ala. 1995)); Alaska (Savage Arms, Inc. v. 
W. Auto Supply Co., 18 P.3d 49, 58 (Alaska 2001)); Michigan (Turner v. Bituminous 
Cas. Co., 244 N.W.2d 873, 881-82 (Mich. 1976)); Ohio (Flaugher v. Cone Automatic 
Mach. Co., 507 N.E.2d 331, 334 (Ohio 1987)); and South Carolina (Holloway v. John E. 
Smith’s Sons Co., 432 F. Supp. 454, 455 (D.S.C. 1977) (applying South Carolina law)). 
 124 States following the product line approach include California (Ray v. Alad 
Corp., 560 P.2d 3, 11 (Cal. 1977)); New Jersey (Ramirez v. Amsted Indus., Inc. 431 A.2d 
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state now follows both the continuity of enterprise and product 
line approaches.125   
II. ANALYZING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SUCCESSOR 
LIABILITY IN CHANNELING RESPONSIBILITY BACK TO THE 
MANUFACTURER 
A. Channeling Responsibility: The Less Restrictive 
Approaches 
The continuing use of the less restrictive approaches 
serves the interests of corrective justice and public policy.  
Redesigning Successor Liability posited that the continuity of 
enterprise and product line approaches more effectively 
channel responsibility for products liability back to the 
predecessor corporation than does the traditional approach.126  
The article asserted that the less restrictive approaches do so 
by forcing successor corporations to consider the projected cost 
of the predecessor’s products liability at the time the successor 
purchases the predecessor.127  If a successor corporation has 
reason to believe it may sustain products liability costs related 
to the predecessor’s product, it will offer less money in the 
transaction and may use the savings to purchase appropriate 
  
811, 817 (N.J. 1981)); New Mexico (Garcia v. Coe Mfg. Co., 933 P.2d 243, 248-50 (N.M. 
1997)); Pennsylvania (Dawejko v. Jorgensen Steel Co., 434 A.2d 106, 110 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 1981)); and Washington (Martin v. Abbott Labs., 689 P.2d 368, 388 (Wash. 1984)).  
Four separate Connecticut lower courts have applied the product line exception. See 
Pastorick v. Lyn-Lad Truck Racks, Inc., No. CV 960562426S, 1999 WL 608674, at *2 
(Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 3, 1999); Sullivan v. A.W. Flint Co., No. CV 920339263, 1996 
WL 469716, at *7, *8 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 5, 1996); Kennedy v. Oshkosh Truck 
Corp., No. CV 920510394S, 1995 WL 27400, at *2, *4 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 18, 1995); 
Copperthite v. Pytlik, No. 59053, 1992 WL 209660, at *4 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 25, 
1992). 
 125 This state is Mississippi (Huff v. Shopsmith, Inc., 786 So. 2d 383, 388 
(Miss. 2001) (product line); Mozingo v. Correct Mfg. Corp., 752 F.2d 168, 174-76 (5th 
Cir. 1985) (continuity of enterprise)).  New York’s current status regarding continuity 
of enterprise is unclear.  As addressed above, it has clearly rejected the product line 
approach.  See supra notes 99-114 and accompanying text.  Its lower courts have made 
mixed and inconsistent rulings on continuity of enterprise, and thus the status of the 
doctrine is unclear.  For examples of lower New York courts holding the successor 
liable if it is selling the same product line sold by the predecessor or if it falls within 
the continuity of enterprise approach, see McCaffrey v. Weaver Jack Corp., No. CV 89- 
3910, 1992 WL 266923, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 1992); Salvati v. Blaw-Knox Food & 
Chem. Equip., Inc., 497 N.Y.S.2d 242, 247 (Sup. Ct. 1985) (adopting continuity of 
enterprise).  However, as addressed above, Semenetz casts doubt on the future of 
continuity of enterprise in New York even though it expressly declined to address the 
issue under the facts before it.  See supra notes 99-114 and accompanying text. 
 126 See Cupp, supra note 17, at 861, 863, 867, 895-96. 
 127 Id. at 861-63. 
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insurance against potential successor liability.  Thus, the 
responsible predecessor will ultimately, and appropriately, 
bear most of the cost.  
The article further advocated that the less restrictive 
approaches are fairer and more efficient than the traditional 
approach because “[p]roduct consumers may be less able than 
successor corporations to plan for the possibility of loss 
following a predecessor’s dissolution and may have less ability 
to protect themselves from such loss.”128  The potential 
successor, on the other hand, “is [often] in as good or better a 
position as the predecessor manufacturer to determine whether 
products made by the predecessor are defective and will lead to 
liability if the successor chooses to purchase the predecessor’s 
assets.”129  Although Redesigning Successor Liability recognized 
that allowing more successor liability through application of 
the less restrictive approaches does place an additional burden 
on successor corporations to pay for defective products that 
they did not make or sell, “[t]he burden of successor liability is 
mitigated by the existence of readily available and relatively 
inexpensive insurance.”130 
B. The Counterarguments 
In Imperfect Liability Regimes,131 Professor Richard 
Epstein argued that the possibility that liability concerns 
might scrub transactions is “overlooked in Professor Cupp’s 
channeling argument.”132  In the 2002 article, Epstein asserted 
that adopting the less restrictive approaches may lead 
corporations, for financial reasons and to avoid risk, to 
liquidate or sell off assets piecemeal rather than sell to 
successors when the value of potential legal claims against a 
corporation exceeds its market value.133  This, Epstein argued, 
may result in a “relentless strategy of fragmentation [that will] 
destroy the going concern value of the business.”134  It may also, 
in Professor Epstein’s estimation, make it difficult for a future 
plaintiff to locate the appropriate defendants, and tort 
  
 128 Id. at 867. 
 129 Id. at 867-68. 
 130 Id. at 870. 
 131 Epstein, supra note 30. 
 132 Id. at 1170. 
 133 Id.  
 134 Id. at 1170. 
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claimants may often find it impossible to recover anything.135  
On the other hand, removing successor liability, while also 
limiting a tort claimant’s ability to recover, “at least preserves 
the going concern value of the business.”136  
Dismissing an argument that insurance could dissuade 
liquidation or at least protect claimants in the event of 
liquidation, Epstein cited to administration and foreseeability 
issues.137  Epstein argued that in many cases buyers will not be 
able “to estimate this long tail of the initial exposure,”138 and 
that, in any event, it is not possible to adequately insure when 
“neither buyers nor sellers of such businesses had any 
awareness of the implicit products liability risk.”139  He cites 
asbestos, DES, and lead paint as illustrations of situations 
where the risk was originally unknowable.140  On the flip side, 
companies would be engaging in “expensive transactions to 
respond to a nonexistent risk.”141 
Professor Reilly echoed Professor Epstein’s concerns 
about unknowable risks in her 2003 article entitled Making 
Sense of Successor Liability.142  Professor Reilly argued that 
“Cupp’s model of the transferee as the least cost insurer of 
creditors’ loss misses an important limitation on the 
transferee’s capacity to channel or internalize creditors’ risk of 
loss to the debtor.”143  She asserted that Redesigning Successor 
Liability’s channeling-back argument for imposing the less 
restrictive approaches to successor liability “does not consider 
the hard case where neither the transferor nor transferee could 
have known either the magnitude or the probability of loss 
from future claims against the transferor.”144  On the insurance 
point, Professor Reilly argues that unknowable risks are “by 
  
 135 Id. 
 136 Id.   
 137 Epstein, supra note 30, at 1171-73. 
 138 Id. at 1172-73. 
 139 Id. at 1173. 
 140 Id. at 1172-73 (“The one point that is clear about each and every one of 
these transactions [lead pigment, asbestos, DES] is that neither buyers nor sellers of 
such businesses had any awareness of the implicit products liability risk at the time 
these early corporate transactions took place.”). 
 141 Id. at 1172. 
 142 Reilly, supra note 31, at 783-84. 
 143 Id. at 790. 
 144 Id. 
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definition” not insurable, and there is therefore no incentive to 
internalize loss.145 
C.  A Response: Killing Again the Ghost of Imputed Liability 
for Unforeseeable Risks 
Professor Epstein’s and Professor Reilly’s critiques of 
the less restrictive approaches fail to consider how courts 
address products liability claims involving truly unforeseeable 
risks.  Their concern that the less restrictive approaches to 
successor liability will in many cases unfairly saddle 
corporations with liability that was unforeseeable at the time 
assets were transferred seems to rely at least in part on a 
misguided assumption—that courts generally are willing to 
impute knowledge of risks where those risks were not 
reasonably knowable at the time of manufacture or sale.  To 
the contrary, courts typically refuse to assign liability based on 
imputed knowledge in products liability cases.146  Rather, most 
courts will only allow liability where the seller (i.e., the 
predecessor corporation) knew or should have known of the 
  
 145 Id.  Reilly also argues a fraud-based theory that “judicial rhetoric that 
elevates continuity as a fraud-free justification for successor liability is the risk of 
unpredictable, and potentially huge, transferee liability.”  Id. at 791.  Although “huge” 
transferee liability may in fact occur, the size of the verdict in and of itself does not 
make the invocation of the less restrictive approaches unfair, particularly when one 
considers that the transferee corporation will be able to withstand a large verdict 
better than an individual products liability plaintiff can withstand a tragic injury with 
no recourse.  As for the argument that the liability will be unpredictable, there is no 
indication that history demonstrates any more unpredictability in these cases than in 
those where fraud-based or other traditional approaches have been applied.   
 146 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. m (1997) 
(“Recognizing the convergence of the theories of negligence and strict liability in design 
cases, the commentators have argued that, for strict liability to be of any consequence 
in such cases, knowledge of risks that were unknowable at the time of marketing 
should be imputed to manufacturers. This, however, the courts have consistently failed 
to do.” (quoting 4 FINAL REPORT OF THE LEGAL STUDY, INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON 
PRODUCTS LIABILITY 109-10 (1977))); Anderson v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 810 
P.2d 549, 557 (Cal. 1991) (“[W]e hereby adopt the requirement, as propounded by the 
Restatement Second of Torts and acknowledged by the lower courts of this state and the 
majority of jurisdictions, that knowledge or knowability is a component of strict 
liability for failure to warn.”); Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470, 480 (Cal. 1988) 
(“[L]iability is conditioned on the actual or constructive knowledge of the risk by the 
manufacturer as of the time the product was sold or distributed.”); Olson v. Prosoco, 
Inc., 522 N.W.2d 284, 289 (Iowa 1994) (“[W]e have refused in the past to impose a duty 
upon manufacturers to warn of unknowable dangers.”); Feldman v. Lederle Labs., 479 
A.2d 374, 386 (N.J. 1984) (“Similarly, as to warnings, generally conduct should be 
measured by knowledge at the time the manufacturer distributed the product. Did the 
defendant know, or should he have known, of the danger, given the scientific, 
technological, and other information available when the product was distributed; or, in 
other words, did he have actual or constructive knowledge of the danger?”). 
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product’s risks when the product was sold.147  This is true 
whether the claims are based on design defect or failure to 
warn—in manufacturing flaw cases, knowledge of risks is of 
limited relevance under strict liability, and in any event the 
scope of liability for manufacturing defects tends to be 
significantly narrower than that of design and warning claims 
since manufacturing defect claims typically involve only a sole 
defective product rather than an entire product line.148  As 
recently noted by Professor David Owen, “The ghost of the 
Wade-Keeton test [an often-used title for the practice of 
imposing liability for unknowable risks] continues to haunt 
judicial halls, but its time has come and gone.”149 
The Restatement (Third) recognizes and strongly 
supports the judicial rejection of imposing responsibility for 
unknowable risks:  “Although there is language in some cases 
which appears to indicate a leaning toward imputation of 
knowledge of unknowable risks upon the manufacturer, the 
overwhelming majority of courts have evaluated the product on 
the basis of what dangers could have been known at the time of 
marketing.”150  The Restatement (Third) concludes:  “Given the 
criticism that has been leveled against the imputation of 
knowledge doctrine and the relatively thin judicial support for 
it, it is here rejected as a doctrinal matter.”151    
The Restatement (Third)’s rejection of imputing 
knowledge of unknowable risks reflects the views of numerous 
scholars.  Several writers have debunked the idea that courts 
typically do or should apply liability where risks are 
unforeseeable at the time of sale.152  Even the scholars who 
  
 147 See supra note 146. 
 148 Id. 
 149 DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW 534 (2005). 
 150 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. m (1997) (also 
recognizing that the doctrine of imputed knowledge “has not worn well with time” and 
has “little support” where it “significantly affects defendants’ liabilities”). 
 151 Id. 
 152 See, e.g., 1 DAVID G. OWEN ET AL., MADDEN & OWEN ON PRODUCTS 
LIABILITY 500 (3d ed. 2000) (“At least one state legislature has abolished the judicial 
adoption of the Wade-Keeton test, and one wonders at its staying power around the 
nation.  Although the ghost of the Wade-Keeton test continues to haunt judicial halls, 
its time has come and gone.”); DAVID G. OWEN ET AL., PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND SAFETY 
545 (3d ed. 1996) [hereinafter PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND SAFETY] (“As the notion of true 
‘strict’ products liability has been sliding into disfavor in design and warnings cases in 
recent years, the Wade-Keeton test has declined as well.”); Michael D. Green, 
Negligence = Economic Efficiency: Doubts 75 TEX. L. REV. 1605, 1632 (1997) (“Keeton’s 
advocacy for imputed knowledge had its apogee in 1982 when the New Jersey Supreme 
Court accepted it in Beshada v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., but it retains little 
vitality today.”); James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Doctrinal Collapse in 
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initially proposed the concept of imputed knowledge, Deans 
John Wade and Page Keeton,153 later in their careers disavowed 
the oft-criticized and seldom-applied doctrine.154  Dean Wade, in 
particular, emphasized that he did not intend the “assumed-
knowledge” language to be taken completely literally:  “Indeed, 
I now would be inclined to think that there is no longer any 
particular value in using the assumed-knowledge language. . . . 
It always had overtones of fiction, and, like all fictions, it can 
create difficulties if taken literally.”155 
The trend away from imputed knowledge appears to be 
well-grounded.  Strict liability was not created as a means of 
imposing absolute liability, and imputing knowledge of 
unknowable risks often leads to results at or near the line of 
absolute liability.156  This is particularly true in failure to warn 
cases, where warnings are generally quite inexpensive to 
  
Products Liability: The Empty Shell of Failure to Warn, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 265, 274 
(1990) (“If we assume, under the fairness view, that a basic postulate of legal duty is 
that the conduct the law seeks to induce is capable of being performed and, as a 
corollary, that the law eschews imposing duties to perform impossible tasks, then 
imposing liability for failure to warn of unknowable risks is grossly unfair. . . . A rule 
that penalizes longevity and contradicts fundamental rules of risk spreading by asking 
the impossible of manufacturers is counterproductive and likely headed for oblivion.”); 
Aaron D. Twerski, A Moderate and Restrained Federal Product Liability Bill: Targeting 
the Crisis Areas for Resolution, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 575, 607 (1985) (concluding 
that most courts claiming to apply strict products liability “are not prepared to impose 
liability for information that the defendant could not have reasonably foreseen at the 
time of distribution”); Ellen Wertheimer, Unknowable Dangers and the Death of Strict 
Products Liability: The Empire Strikes Back, 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 1183, 1206 n.76 (1992) 
(discussing courts’ refusal to impose upon manufacturers knowledge of all dangers in 
product, whether they were unknowable at time of marketing or not); Charles C. 
Marvel, Annotation, Strict Products Liability: Liability for Failure to Warn as 
Dependent on Defendant’s Knowledge of Danger, 33 A.L.R. 4th 368 §2 (1984) (“Often 
citing [RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 40A cmt. j], the courts for the most part, in 
jurisdictions generally espousing the doctrine of strict products liability (when a 
negligence theory is applied, there is no question that actual or constructive knowledge 
is an essential element), hold that liability based upon a failure to warn users of a 
product’s inherently dangerous quality or characteristic may be imposed only where 
the manufacturer, distributor, or seller, as the case may be, had actual or constructive 
knowledge of the dangerous quality or characteristic.”). 
 153 See Page Keeton, Products Liability—Some Observations About Allocation 
of Risks, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1329, 1335 (1966); John W. Wade, On the Nature of Strict 
Tort Liability for Products, 44 MISS. L.J. 825, 834-35 (1973). 
 154 See Keeton, supra note 34, at 595 (stating that “a product’s design should 
normally be measured in terms of whether or not it was feasible to do a better job in 
the light of the technology that was available at the time” of manufacture); Wade, 
supra note 34, at 764 (stating that the value of the imputed knowledge doctrine “was in 
explaining the concept of strict liability when it was new by clearly contrasting it with 
negligence in which the defendant’s actual culpability in failing to learn of the 
dangerousness of the product had to be shown”). 
 155 Wade, supra note 34, at 764. 
 156 See, e.g., Victor E. Schwartz, The Death of “Super Strict Liability”:  
Common Sense Returns to Tort Law, 27 GONZ. L. REV. 179, 179-80 (1991). 
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provide.157  As one commentator has recognized, “[i]t is poor 
public policy to demand that product manufacturers make their 
products safer than is technologically possible, or demand that 
manufacturers warn of unknowable risks.  Such ‘super strict 
liability’ discourages manufacturers from developing and 
marketing new products, thereby depriving consumers of 
desirable goods.”158  Additionally, scholars have noted the 
inherent inequities in a system founded on requiring 
performance of impossible duties.159  
Further, clearly unknowable risks are relatively rare.160  
This is in part due to the standard courts apply in holding 
manufacturers to the knowledge of experts in the field.161  In 
that capacity, “manufacturers must keep abreast of scientific 
knowledge, discoveries, and advances, and are presumed to 
know what is imparted thereby.”162  What the manufacturer 
actually knew is not the issue, but rather what the 
manufacturer could have discovered by fulfilling its obligations 
as an expert.163  Under this standard, sellers generally are 
  
 157 See Richard L. Cupp Jr. & Danielle Polage, The Rhetoric of Strict Products 
Liability Versus Negligence:  An Empirical Analysis, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 874, 888 (2002). 
 158 See Schwartz, supra note 156, at 180. 
 159 See, e.g., Henderson & Twerski, supra note 152, at 274 (“If we assume, 
under the fairness view, that a basic postulate of legal duty is that the conduct the law 
seeks to induce is capable of being performed and, as a corollary, that the law eschews 
imposing duties to perform impossible tasks, then imposing liability for failure to warn 
of unknowable risks is grossly unfair. . . . A rule that penalizes longevity and 
contradicts fundamental rules of risk spreading by asking the impossible of 
manufacturers is counterproductive and likely headed for oblivion.”). 
 160 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. m, Reporters’ 
Note (1997) (quoting 4 FINAL REPORT OF THE LEGAL STUDY, INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE 
ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY 109-10 (1977)); see also Ellen Wertheimer, The Biter Bit:  
Unknowable Dangers, The Third Restatement, and the Reinstatement of Liability 
Without Fault, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 889, 898 (2005) (recognizing that the “original tests 
for defect did not deal explicitly with the problem presented by liability for dangers 
that were unknowable at the time the product was manufactured”). 
 161 See, e.g., Feldman v. Lederle Labs., 479 A.2d 374, 386 (N.J. 1984) 
(“Further, a manufacturer is held to the standard of an expert in the field.”). 
 162 63A AM. JUR. 2D Products Liability § 1140 (2004); see also Klem v. E.I. 
Dupont De Nemours Co., 19 F.3d 997, 1001-02 (5th Cir. 1994); George v. Celotex Corp., 
914 F.2d 26, 28 (2d Cir. 1990).  
 163 See, e.g., Dartez v. Fibreboard Corp., 765 F.2d 456, 461 (5th Cir. 1985) 
(“Borel holds all manufacturers to the knowledge and skill of an expert. They are 
obliged to keep abreast of any scientific discoveries and are presumed to know the 
results of all such advances. Moreover, they each bear the duty to fully test their 
products to uncover all scientifically discoverable dangers before the products are 
sold.”); see also Anderson v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 810 P.2d 549, 559 (Cal. 
1991) (“[T]he manufacturer is liable if it failed to give warning of dangers that were 
known to the scientific community at the time it manufactured or distributed the 
product.”). 
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accountable for risks associated with their products even 
without applying an imputed knowledge approach. 
Asbestos litigation—relied upon by Professor Epstein in 
his critique of the less restrictive approaches as an example of 
a potentially unknowable risk164—in actuality provides an 
illustration of the rarity of clearly unknowable risks.  Many 
experts and courts now agree that the asbestos industry was in 
fact aware of the risks well before they stopped marketing the 
product.165  This fits the too-familiar practice of manufacturers 
asserting that they were not aware of a risk, but being found by 
courts to have in fact known about it, or that they should have 
known about it.166 
Professor Epstein also cites DES and lead paint as 
examples of cases where successor liability possibly could not 
be factored into a business sale price due to unknowable 
risks.167  However, as with asbestos litigation, in these cases, 
plaintiffs generally have only been allowed to go forward when 
courts have found that the manufacturer knew or should have 
known of the risk.168  Again, courts have generally rejected the 
  
 164 See Epstein, supra note 30, at 1165-66. 
 165 See Brown & Root, Inc. v. Moore, 92 S.W.3d 848, 856 (Tex. App. 2002) 
(holding that decedent’s estate was entitled to exemplary damages because “evidence 
was raised that Brown & Root had subjective knowledge of the risks associated with 
asbestos but acted with conscious indifference to the rights of the workers at Lone Star 
Steel” during the period of 1977-1985); see also Dartez, 765 F.2d at 461 (“If the dangers 
of asbestos were known to Johns-Manville at the time of Dartez’s exposure, then the 
same risks were scientifically discoverable by other asbestos corporations. Therefore, 
the testimony of the medical director of the industry’s largest member is relevant to 
plaintiff’s attempt to meet the evidentiary burden defined by Borel.”). 
 166 Cigarette industry executives’ 1994 testimony before Congress that 
nicotine is not addictive provides a particularly egregious illustration.  See Nearly 50 
Years of Conflict Over Role of Smoking in Health, THE BALTIMORE SUN, July 15, 2000, 
at 6A.  
 167 See Epstein, supra note 30, at 1165. 
 168 See, e.g., McMahon v. Eli Lilly & Co., 774 F.2d 830, 835 (7th Cir. 1985) 
(DES case: “Under Illinois precedent, to prevail on a failure to warn claim, a plaintiff 
must show ‘that the manufacturer knew or should have known of the danger presented 
by the use or consumption of the product’ and that the manufacturer did not warn of 
the product’s ‘dangerous propensities.’”) (citation omitted); Brown v. Superior Court, 
751 P.2d 470, 481 (Cal. 1988) (DES case: “Thus, we disagree with plaintiff’s assertion 
that defendants should be held liable for failing to warn the physician who prescribed 
DES to plaintiff’s mother of alleged defects in the drug that were neither known by 
defendants nor scientifically knowable at the time the drug was distributed.”); Grover 
v. Eli Lilly & Co., 591 N.E.2d 696, 700 (Ohio 1992) (DES case: “The manufacturer does 
not breach its duty to warn—in negligence, in strict liability for breach of warranty, or 
in strict liability in tort—until the company knew or should have known of a particular 
risk through the exercise of ordinary care.”).  Cf. David P. Swenson, “Market Share 
Recovery for Risk” as a Preemptive Remedy for Childhood Lead Poisoning, 11 LAW & 
INEQ. 585, 592 (1993) (“Property owners who sue paint manufacturers must prove the 
manufacturers knew or should have known of the danger inherent in lead paint used in 
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imputed knowledge approach in cases where risks were truly 
unknowable.169  And in the DES and lead paint cases, again 
similar to asbestos litigation and indeed most claims of 
unknowable risks, imputed knowledge may not even be needed, 
as arguments now exist that the manufacturers in fact knew or 
should have known of the risks inherent in those products 
when sales were being made.170  Asbestos, DES, and lead paint 
cases help to disprove the notion that cases are generally 
proceeding despite the unforeseeability of risks.  Rather, in 
most instances, judgments are only permitted or upheld when 
courts find that the product risks involved were at least 
reasonably knowable. 
An argument may be asserted that even if 
manufacturers need to have been aware of some level of 
product danger to be liable, perhaps they may not have been 
aware of the amount of money that would have to spend in 
litigation, settlements, and judgments associated with the 
product risk they knew or should have known about.171  
However, this amounts to a criticism of tort law in general 
rather than a specific criticism of successor liability.  
Manufacturers of defective products, and indeed all tort 
defendants, are liable to all foreseeable plaintiffs for all 
foreseeable harm caused by their tortious acts or failures to 
act.172  Challenges in knowing just how much the damages will 
  
residences and that by continuing to market lead paint they breached a duty to 
foreseeable victims.”). 
 169 See supra note 146 and accompanying text.  
 170 See, e.g., McMahon, 774 F.2d at 835-36 (“There was sufficient evidence 
from which a jury could reasonably have found that in 1955 Lilly knew or should have 
known that DES might cause reproductive abnormalities, such as prematurity, in the 
female offspring of women exposed to DES during pregnancy.”); Grover, 591 N.E.2d at 
702, 703 (Resnick, J., dissenting) (“In light of the foregoing there can be no question 
that pharmaceutical companies should have known the dangers of this drug. If in the 
1930s and 1940s the manufacturers of DES knew or should have known of the 
reproductive system defects in the animal fetus exposed to DES, how then is it not 
foreseeable that this might mean abnormalities in the human fetus’ reproductive 
system? In other words, it would appear that DES manufacturers knew or should have 
known that the human fetus exposed in utero might have a defect in the female 
reproductive system.  Additionally, is it not then foreseeable that that female fetus 
would at some point seek to employ the defective reproductive system? The answer 
must be a resounding ‘yes.’”); Thomas v. Mallett, 701 N.W.2d 523, 558 (Wis. 2005) 
(discussing in depth the scientific documentation of the risks of lead poisoning and 
concluding that “[m]any of the individual defendants or their predecessors-in-interest 
did more than simply contribute to a risk; they knew of the harm white lead carbonate 
pigments caused and continued production and promotion of the pigment 
notwithstanding that knowledge”). 
 171 See Epstein, supra note 30, at 1170. 
 172 See generally Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).  
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total are not a novelty reserved for successor liability claims, 
and criticism based on such challenges is not persuasive.  If 
tort liability were only allowed in personal injury cases where 
the amount of potential damages is clearly knowable, very few 
personal injury cases would ever be permitted.  Further, “[i]n 
back of the tort system is an insurance system,” and insurance 
actuaries routinely factor in potential liability variables when 
setting tort insurance rates.173  Indeed, for the relatively brief 
times when liability insurance “crises” were widely heralded, 
arguments have been made that the problems related more to 
unwise pricing practices by the insurance industry than to an 
unpredictable tort system.174 
In addition to addressing unforeseeability of risks, 
Professor Epstein also raises the hypothetical situation where 
new theories of liability arise, and the seller is not able to 
predict that they would arise.175  However, that type of 
situation would be quite rare—efforts at new causes of action 
impacting large numbers of products cases do not succeed very 
often in products liability’s maturing landscape (described by 
Professor Owen as the “graying” of products liability).176  
Indeed, Epstein’s primary example—the novel use of public 
nuisance theories for gun liability177—does not appear to be 
catching on in the courts.  With limited exception, courts are 
unwilling to impose liability on gun manufacturers for public 
nuisance.178  The courts recognize that doing so would 
  
 173 VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ, KATHRYN KELLY & DAVID F. PARTLETT, PROSSER, 
WADE & SCHWARTZ’S TORTS 2 (11th ed. 2005). 
 174 See PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND SAFETY, supra note 152, at 1093-96. 
 175 Epstein, supra note 30, at 1172-73. 
 176 See infra note 185 and accompanying text. 
 177 See Epstein, supra note 30, at 1173. 
 178 See, e.g., Donald G. Gifford, Public Nuisance as a Mass Products Liability 
Tort, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 741, 764 (2003) (“To date, litigation against gun manufacturers 
has yielded the vast majority of legal opinions addressing the legal viability of the 
public nuisance theory of recovery in the context of mass products liability. In most 
cases, courts dismiss these public nuisance claims . . . .”); see also Frank J. Vandall, A 
Preliminary Consideration of Issues Raised in the Firearms Sellers Immunity Bill, 38 
AKRON L. REV. 113, 117 (2005) (“Strict liability and negligent design, as well as public 
nuisance and fraud claims, have been rejected. The recent victories by the gun 
manufacturers in both design defect and damage to cities, suggest that widespread 
immunity is unnecessary at this time.”).  Some of the cases rejecting public nuisance 
claims against gun manufacturers include: District of Columbia v. Beretta U.S.A. 
Corp., 872 A.2d 633 (D.C. 2005) (en banc) (rejecting public nuisance claims against gun 
manufacturers and distributors); Camden County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders v. Beretta 
U.S.A. Corp., 273 F.3d 536 (3d Cir. 2001) (applying New Jersey law); Tioga Pub. Sch. 
Dist. #15 v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 984 F.2d 915 (8th Cir. 1993) (applying North Dakota 
law); City of Philadelphia v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 126 F. Supp. 2d 882, 909 (E.D. Pa. 
2000) (applying Pennsylvania law) (“One way in which the role of public nuisance law 
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improperly “loosen the tort from the traditional moorings of 
duty, proximate causation, foreseeability, and remoteness.”179   
Further, when courts do not dismiss nuisance cases 
against gun manufacturers at the pleading stages, some of 
those cases do not even involve products liability claims.  
Rather, the allegations may be for “affirmative conduct on the 
part of manufacturers and distributors that fosters an illegal 
secondary gun market that interfered with the public right to 
safety”180—claims involving risks most would agree are not 
unknowable, since they allege affirmative misconduct.  And 
even courts that allow public nuisance claims based on 
products liability-like allegations to proceed beyond the 
pleading stages still require or at least recognize proof of 
foreseeability.181   
The resistance to public lawsuits against gun 
manufacturers, however, is simply one example of a developing 
trend to limit products liability.  Change in products liability 
law has been slowing down, and the spirit of radical expansion 
has been replaced with a more middle-of-the-road mentality.182  
The recent expansion of asbestos liability raised as a possible 
rejoinder to this point by Professor Epstein has not been so 
much an expansion of legal theory by courts as an expansion of 
targeted defendants by plaintiffs’ lawyers, with the targeting 
based on stream-of-distribution liability rules that predate the 
cessation of asbestos sales, and the rules of joint and several 
  
has been restricted is the refusal to apply the tort in the context of injuries caused by 
defective product design and distribution.”); City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 
821 N.E.2d 1099 (Ill. 2004). 
 179 Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 872 A.2d at 646. 
 180 See, e.g., Ileto v. Glock Inc., 349 F.3d 1191, 1211 n.26 (9th Cir. 2003) 
(applying California law) (“Plaintiff’s nuisance claim, however, is not about the 
manufacture or distribution of a defective or properly functioning product. Notably, 
plaintiffs do not allege a product defect but rather allege affirmative conduct [such as 
oversaturation of the market] on the part of manufacturers and distributors that 
fosters an illegal secondary gun market that interfered with the public right to 
safety.”). 
 181 See, e.g., White v. Smith & Wesson, 97 F. Supp. 2d 816, 830 (N.D. Ohio 
2000) (applying Ohio law) (“Plaintiffs’ nuisance claims will likely rise or fall with their 
negligence claims.”); Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 768 N.E.2d 1136, 1143 (Ohio 
2002) (municipality stated a claim for public nuisance against gun manufacturer when 
“the complaint clearly alleged both intentional and negligent misconduct on appellees’ 
part. For example, Paragraph 119 of the complaint alleged that defendants 
‘intentionally and recklessly market, distribute and sell handguns that defendants 
know, or reasonably should know, will be obtained by persons with criminal 
purposes.’”). 
 182 See Epstein, supra note 30, at 1173.  
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liability that are much older yet.183  This is not at all an 
argument that the expansion of asbestos liability is societally 
beneficial or appropriate (indeed, one of this article’s authors 
has been and remains strongly critical of the expansion),184 but 
rather that current cases are based primarily on legal doctrines 
that existed when many or most of the product sales currently 
at issue in asbestos litigation took place.   
Professor David Owen describes the slowing down of 
products liability evolution in The Graying of Products 
Liability:   
In recent years, however, the law in this area has been evolving 
more toward middle ground and compromise, away from the starker 
approaches of its youth.  The evolution of products liability law, 
mirrored in the new Restatement, thus may be viewed as a 
progression from the blacks and whites of early years to a modern 
blend of boring grays—‘reasonable,’ perhaps, from a variety of 
perspectives, but devoid of the lively clash of claims of right and 
wrong that marked the early years.185  
For better or worse, in most areas of products liability, courts 
and legislatures are in general quite selective in expanding 
substantive liability rules, further minimizing Professor 
Epstein’s concern.  Hypothetical and unlikely concerns that 
doctrine may some day dramatically expand (with no evidence 
of such doctrinal expansion on the horizon) should not derail an 
approach to liability that provides the most desirable results in 
real cases. 
Analyzing whether the sky will fall if courts adopt the 
less restrictive approaches to successor liability does not 
require hypothesizing.  As discussed above, one or more of the 
less restrictive approaches are in effect in several large 
states.186  If the approaches were to cause the sky to fall, it 
should already be doing so in California and in many other 
parts of the nation.  Significantly, little if any evidence exists of 
any outcry that the less restrictive successor liability rules are 
actually causing dissolutions or piecemeal asset sales.187  To the 
  
 183 See generally Richard L. Cupp, Jr. Asbestos Litigation and Bankruptcy: A 
Case Study for Ad Hoc Public Policy Limitations on Joint & Several Liability, 31 PEPP. 
L. REV. 203 (2003). 
 184 Id. 
 185 David G. Owen, The Graying of Products Liability Law:  Paths Taken and 
Untaken in the New Restatement, 61 TENN. L. REV. 1241, 1243 (1994). 
 186 See supra notes 35-125 and accompanying text. 
 187 Cf. Savage Arms, Inc. v. W. Auto Supply Co., 18 P.3d 49, 56 (Alaska 2001) 
(“But we have not been referred to any evidence that adopting this modern ‘continuity 
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contrary, some advisors have even counseled companies to seek 
to prevent predecessor corporation dissolutions as a way of 
avoiding successor liability, at least under the merger and 
consolidation theories of successor liability.188  Thus, the 
situation “on the ground” seems to be another practical 
endorsement of the less restrictive approaches.  A ready 
insurance market is presently covering successor liability 
claims, providing protection to successor corporations 
concerned about inheriting liability.189  According to an expert 
in the field, businesses purchasing predecessor corporations or 
product lines presenting the greatest risks of products liability 
are, appropriately, the most likely to invest in successor 
products liability insurance.190 
III. CONCLUSION 
Courts’ struggle over whether to apply the traditional 
approach or one of the less restrictive approaches to successor 
liability is ongoing.  Cases in recent years have demonstrated 
that the less restrictive approaches are continuing to find new 
jurisdictional homes, and are neither dead to growth nor the 
subject of overwhelming judicial rejection as asserted by the 
Restatement (Third).191  However, other recent decisions 
rejecting one or more of the less restrictive approaches show 
  
of enterprise’ exception (or the marginally more popular ‘product line’ exception) has in 
fact increased the number of corporate liquidations or piecemeal breakups, or that 
rejecting the modern exceptions has in fact decreased liquidations or piecemeal sales.”); 
Simmons v. Mark Lift Indus., Inc., 622 S.E.2d 213, 221-22 (S.C. 2005) (Burnett, J., 
dissenting) (“I reject as speculative and unfounded the argument that holding a 
successor liable in a product liability action will damage business interests or prompt 
rash decisions by corporations. Terex has not cited, nor have I found, any studies or 
evidence demonstrating that the view I propose would inhibit asset-based transactions, 
lead to increased piecemeal sales, or discourage large-scale transfers. Potential legal 
liability often is a factor every responsible corporation must consider; however, it is not 
the driving or primary force behind every decision. Successors contracting for an asset 
transfer in a free market, when they intend to continue the basic enterprise, will 
negotiate a price which reflects the fair market value of the transfer, taking heed of the 
risk of future claims.”). 
 188 Robert M. Folger & Rob Witwer, Buying, Selling, and Combining 
Businesses Under the Colorado Business Corporation Act, 33 COLO. LAW. 73, 77 (Nov. 
2004) (“Acquirers seeking to avoid successor liability may wish to take steps (through a 
covenant or other binding obligation) to prevent the immediate post-sale dissolution of 
the Seller.”). 
 189 Telephone interview with Jeff Brown, Credit Union Project Manager, The 
Chubb Corporation, in Warren, N.J. (July 26, 2006). 
 190 Id. 
 191 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 12 cmt. b, Reporters’ Note 
(1997). 
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that none of the approaches—traditional or less restrictive—
are on the verge of achieving dominance. 
Although none of the approaches are currently 
dominant, the less restrictive approaches are better.  Someone 
has to lose when an innocent consumer is injured by a defective 
product and only an innocent successor corporation is available 
as a defendant.  The difference between the innocent consumer 
and the innocent successor corporation is that the successor 
corporation has a means by which to protect itself and channel 
responsibility back to the responsible predecessor corporation 
through a discounted purchase price if the less restrictive 
approaches are applied.  Under the traditional approach, the 
consumer—the only party with no realistic options for shifting 
responsibility to the party that caused the harm—generally 
bears the entire loss alone. 
Recent academic criticisms that the less restrictive 
approaches unfairly saddle successor businesses with 
unforeseeable risks ring hollow, as courts, supported by the 
mainstream of scholars, reject applying even strict liability 
when risks are truly unforeseeable (which are in any event 
unusual situations).  Calls to abandon improvements to the 
court-made traditional approach to the legislatures are 
unconvincing in light of more than thirty years of legislative 
failure to enact meaningful reform.  Legislatures’ race-to-the-
bottom incentive to leave consumers unprotected in product 
defect cases involving successor corporations, along with the 
lack of an effective consumer lobby to address issues that are 
decidedly unfriendly to sound-bite politics, leave no reason to 
expect that effective legislative reform is anywhere on the 
horizon.  The less restrictive approaches best serve corrective 
justice and public policy; courts engaged in the ongoing judicial 
redesign of successor liability should embrace them. 
